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INTRODUCTION 
Using qualitative data and historical methods, Barry Friedman as-
serts with confidence that “we the people” influence the decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.1  Using quantitative data and statistical me-
thods, political scientists are not so sure.  Despite their best efforts to 
validate basic claims about the effect of public opinion on the Court, 
the evidence remains mixed at best.2 
We enter this dialogue but in a voice distinct from existing politi-
cal science work.  Rather than explore the relationship between the 
public and the Court on a term-by-term basis, we analyze it at the lev-
el of the case.  This allows us to exploit more nuanced public opinion 
data, as well as to attend to the many other case-level factors that may 
influence the Court’s decisions. 
Based on our analysis, we are prepared to say that Professor 
Friedman is on to something.  When the “mood of the public” is lib-
eral (conservative), the Court is significantly more likely to issue lib-
eral (conservative) decisions.  But why is anyone’s guess.  Professor 
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 1 The full title of Professor Friedman’s book tells the story.  BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF 
THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2009) (stating that the decisions of the Supreme 
Court on contentious issues align with popular approval and public understanding of the 
Constitution). 
 2 See infra Part II. 
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Friedman posits that the Justices will bend to the will of the people 
because the Court requires public support to remain an efficacious 
branch of government.  Our analysis could be read to support this 
view, but it is equally consistent with another mechanism:  that “the 
people” include the Justices.  On this account, the Justices do not re-
spond to public opinion directly, but rather respond to the same 
events or forces that affect the opinion of other members of the pub-
lic.3  Or, as Cardozo once stated, “[t]he great tides and currents 
which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and 
pass the judges by.”4 
Our study proceeds as follows.  In Part II, we briefly review the ex-
tant literature, emphasizing the similar methodology it invokes but 
the varying conclusions it reaches.  Parts III and IV describe our me-
thods and findings.  We end, in Part V, with the implications of our 
statistical work for Professor Friedman’s claims, as well as for future 
research assessing the Court’s response to public opinion. 
II.  THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
Professor Friedman’s book is only the last in a long and distin-
guished line of research evaluating the link between the public and 
the courts.  Much, perhaps most, of the work in the social sciences 
has explored the flipside of Professor Friedman’s interest:  the extent 
to which Court decisions affect (or “move”) public opinion.5  But 
 
 3 The debate between these two accounts has a long history in the political science litera-
ture.  Compare Beverly B. Cook, Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
567, 574 (1977) (showing that federal judges were more lenient with Vietnam War draft 
offenders as public opinion toward the war grew increasingly negative), with Herbert M. 
Kritzer, Federal Judges and Their Political Environments:  The Influence of Public Opinion, 23 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 194, 195–98 (1979) (showing that changes in severity of sentencing did 
not move in the same way as changes in public opinion, possibly reflecting “the judges’ 
own doubts about the war” rather than a direct response to public opinion).  See generally 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 424–25 (2002) (explaining that while it is unsurprising that Supreme 
Court decisions generally correspond with public opinion, it is difficult to determine 
whether public opinion directly influences the Court). 
 4 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921). 
 5 The classic work is Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster:  The 
U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 768 (1989) 
(finding that the Court’s decisions have an impact on the public, but that the impact ma-
nifests itself as both increased support and increased opposition for the position taken by 
the Court’s majority).  For recent research, see, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels & Diana C. Mutz, 
Explaining Processes of Institutional Opinion Leadership, 71 J. POL. 249, 259 (2009), reporting 
experimental evidence that an endorsement from the Court affected respondents’ opi-
nions about particular public policy issues; Mark D. Ramirez, Procedural Perceptions and 
Support for the U.S. Supreme Court, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 675, 676 (2008), arguing that positive 
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there is no shortage of quantitative (and multivariate) work address-
ing directly the question of whether the public influences the Court.  
Rather than waste space with lengthy descriptions of each paper, we 
summarize the key results in Table 1.  We limit our list to studies of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the focus of Professor Friedman’s book.6 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF NOTABLE MULTIVARIATE STUDIES ON THE EFFECT OF 
PUBLIC OPINION ON THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OR 
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES 
Author (Year) Description of Methods and Key Findings
Clark (2009)7 
Examines the number of federal laws struck down 
by the Court each term; finds that as public support for 
the Supreme Court declines, the Court strikes down 
fewer laws. 
 
  
 
media coverage increases support for the Court; James W. Stoutenborough, and Donald 
P. Haider-Markel & Mahalley D. Allen, Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on 
Public Opinion:  Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419, 430 (2006), asserting that the 
Court is able to legitimate controversial policies.  See also Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme 
Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 91, 97 (2000) (relaying the ability 
of particular Court decisions to affect overall evaluations of the Court in the geographic 
areas that gave rise to the case). 
 6 Studies of other federal judges include Cook, supra note 3, at 574; Kritzer, supra note 3, at 
195–98.  There are also studies of state court judges.  These are more uniform in their re-
sults, tending to confirm the obvious:  that (elected) state court judges must consider 
their constituents’ preferences to keep their jobs.  See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majorita-
rian Difficulty:  Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696–97, 788 
(1995) (criticizing elective judiciaries because they respond to majoritarian political pres-
sures); James H. Kuklinski & John E. Stanga, Political Participation and Government Respon-
siveness:  The Behavior of California Superior Courts, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1090, 1093 (1979) 
(explaining findings that California superior courts less in line with public opinion 
showed adjustments in their decisions); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Poli-
tics:  The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 187 (1999) (indicating that 
elected judges rule according to popular views because they wish to be re-elected).  Final-
ly, a growing number of scholars are exploring the relationship between public sentiment 
and judicial decisions in courts outside the United States.  Along these lines, we com-
mend JEFFREY K. STATON, JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO 3–
4 (2010).  Staton documents the Mexican Supreme Court’s “coordinated and aggressive” 
public relations campaign to create public support.  He also shows that courts throughout 
the world publicize their decisions, issue press releases, and maintain websites describing 
their procedures and publishing their cases and biographies of their members. 
 7 Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 971, 985 (2009). 
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Giles et al. (2008)8 
 
 
 
McGuire & Stim-
son (2004)9 
 
Explores the percentage of liberal votes cast by each 
Justice each term; finds that public opinion exerts only 
a small effect and that it operates on “as few as 20%” of 
the Justices serving between 1956 and 1999. 
 
Analyzes the percentage of liberal decisions each 
term in cases in which the Court reverses the court be-
low; shows that the public’s mood affects the percen-
tage even after controlling for ideology. 
 
 
Flemming & 
Wood (1997)10 
Analyzes the percentage of liberal votes cast by each 
Justice each term; shows that the Court’s composition 
accounts for most of the variation, but that the public’s 
mood also exerts a small (though significant and quick) 
effect on most Justices in the majority of legal areas un-
der analysis. 
 
Mishler & Shee-
han (1996)11 
Considers the percentage of liberal votes cast by 
each Justice each term; finds that some moderate Jus-
tices respond to the public mood and concludes that it 
“shapes the subjective norms of individual justices the-
reby potentially influencing their decisions.”12 
 
Stimson et al. 
(1995)13 
Analyzes the ideological direction of decisions each 
term; unearths some responsiveness to the mood of the 
public, but the effect nearly disappears when control-
ling for the Court’s composition. 
 
Link (1995)14 Examines the percentage of liberal decisions each 
 
 8 Micheal W. Giles, Bethany Blackstone & Richard L. Vining, Jr., The Supreme Court in Ameri-
can Democracy:  Unraveling the Linkages Between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 
70 J. POL. 293, 296, 303 (2008). 
 9 Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited:  New Evidence 
on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1033 (2004). 
 10 Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court:  Individual Justice Res-
ponsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 474, 482 (1997). 
 11 William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme 
Court Decision Making:  A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 180 (1996). 
 12 Id. at 174. 
 13 James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen & Robert S. Erikson, Dynamic Representation, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543, 552, 556 (1995). 
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term in criminal procedure and race cases; finds that 
the public’s mood, to greater and lesser extents (and 
with some lags), has a direct effect on Court decisions. 
 
Norpoth & Segal 
(1994)15 
Reexamines Mishler & Sheehan’s 1993 study; finds 
that any change in the direction of the Court’s deci-
sions was due to an “indirect model” of public influ-
ence in which “popularly elected presidents, through 
new appointments, affect the ideological composition 
of the Court.”16 
 
Mishler &    
Sheehan (1993)17 
Explores the percentage of liberal decisions each 
term; finds that (lagged) public mood influences 
Court’s decisions both indirectly (through composition 
changes) and directly; claims that the Justices “are 
broadly aware of fundamental trends in the ideological 
tenor of public opinion, and . . . at least some justices, 
consciously or not, may adjust their decisions at the 
margins to accommodate such fundamental trends.”18 
 
Two features of the studies in Table 1 stand out:  their common 
methodology and their mixed findings.  Both deserve some elabora-
tion. 
A.  Common Methods 
As even a cursory glance at Table 1 reveals, the studies tend to fol-
low the same methodological approach to answer the question of 
whether public opinion influences the Court.  They begin by calculat-
ing the percentage of liberal decisions (or votes) that the Court (an 
individual Justice) reaches each term—or, in the jargon of social 
science, by aggregating decisions (votes) on a term-by-term basis.  
Figure 1 provides an example. 
 
 14 Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court:  Cross-Time Analyses of Criminal 
Procedure and Civil Rights Cases, 48 POL. RES. Q. 61, 67, 75 (1995). 
 15 Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Comment, Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 711 (1994). 
 16 Id. 
 17 William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institu-
tion?  The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 90, 
96 (1993). 
 18 Id. at 89. 
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FIGURE 1.  PERCENTAGE OF LIBERAL DECISIONS, 1953–2008 TERMS 
          1960           1970       1988           1990     2000           2010 
Term 
 
Because almost all the authors use the U.S. Supreme Court Data-
base to categorize decisions as liberal or conservative (as do we in 
Figure 1), their definitions of ideology do not vary much.  Where dif-
ferences emerge are in the types of cases they include in their study.  
For example, some studies analyze only a few areas of the law;19 one 
focuses on reversals;20 and another separates the cases into “salient” 
and “non-salient” categories.21  Figure 1 is a generic depiction of the 
percentage, using all cases decided between the 1953–2008 terms.22  
(As an aside, readers should take care in interpreting Figure 1 or any 
other display based on “percent liberalism” because the types of cases 
the Justices agree to hear and decide in a given term will affect the 
percentage.) 
 
 
 19 See, e.g., Link, supra note 14, at 67 (examining only criminal procedure and civil rights 
cases).  Others analyze separately particular areas of the law or control for areas in the 
analysis.  See, e.g., Flemming & Wood, supra note 10, at 485–92 (evaluating whether specif-
ic issue areas impacted judicial responsiveness to public opinion); McGuire & Stimson, 
supra note 9, at 1025 (reflecting case outcome types for distinct issue areas).   
 20 McGuire & Stimson, supra note 9, at 1019. 
 21 Giles, Blackstone & Vining, supra note 8, at 296. 
 22 The percentage was calculated using the U.S. Supreme Court Database, THE SUPREME 
COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (cases or-
ganized by citation), and orally argued cases (decisionType = 1 or 6 or 7) in which the di-
rection of the decision is liberal or conservative (i.e., we omit the 60 cases coded as “un-
specifiable”). 
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The percentage of liberal decisions (votes) per term is the depen-
dent variable in the studies (i.e., what the authors are trying to ex-
plain).  The key independent variable is, of course, public opinion.  
In other words, the authors are interested in determining whether a 
more liberal public leads the Court (or the individual Justices) to 
produce more liberal decisions (votes) each term, all else being 
equal.  To measure public opinion, the studies typically rely on Stim-
son’s indicator of “public mood.”23  Computed by analyzing survey 
responses to a range of questions with a sophisticated dynamic factor 
analysis model, the indicator is a single number summarizing the 
mood of the public along a liberal-conservative dimension.  Although 
Stimson calculates his measure on a quarterly basis, the articles in 
Table 1 use an annual indicator of mood because their dependent 
variable (percentage liberalism) is also aggregated (though usually to 
the term rather than the year).  Figure 2 displays this annual version. 
FIGURE 2.  STIMSON’S ANNUAL MEASURE OF THE “PUBLIC MOOD,” 1953-
2008 
    1950           1960     1970           1980           1990       2000         2010 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 23 JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA:  MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS (2d ed. 
1999).  Updated at James A. Stimson, Time Series, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, 
http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/time.html. 
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B.  Mixed Findings 
The final step in most of the studies in Table 1 is to analyze 
whether the annual public mood measure explains term-by-term vari-
ation in the Court’s (Justices’) liberal decisions (votes), while control-
ling for other factors that also might affect the percentage of liberal 
decisions (votes) each term.  These other factors almost always in-
clude a measure of the Court’s ideology but otherwise tend to vary 
from study to study.24 
Also varying from study to study are the results, though perhaps it 
is worth starting with a common finding:  virtually all the studies 
demonstrate an indirect effect of public opinion via the appointments 
process.  That is, they tend to show that changes in the Court’s com-
position can lead to a higher or lower percentage of liberal decisions 
each term.  Political scientists deem this “indirect” because the public 
does not directly affect the percentage of liberal decisions; its role 
comes in electing the President and the Senate, who appoint and 
confirm Justices reflecting the public’s preferences.25  Accordingly, 
“the ideological orientation of the Court generally corresponds to the 
attitudes of the electorate”26 and the ruling regime. 
The more controversial matter is whether the public directly influ-
ences Court decisions (as Friedman claims).  The answers from the 
existing literature, as Table 1 suggests, run the gamut.  Perhaps the 
strongest supporters of a direct, causal link between public mood and 
Court decisions, McGuire and Stimson, are as unequivocal as Fried-
man:  “[P]ublic opinion is a powerful influence on the decisions of 
the Supreme Court. . . . [The evidence shows that] a system of popu-
lar representation is alive and well in the Supreme Court.”27  In direct 
juxtaposition comes Norpoth and Segal’s famous reanalysis of Mish-
ler & Sheehan’s 1993 study, in which they declare that “contrary to 
 
 24 E.g., Flemming & Wood, supra note 10, at 468 (controlling for different areas of the law); 
Giles, Blackstone & Vining, supra note 8, at 296 (distinguishing salient and non-salient 
cases); Link, supra note 14, at 69–70 (controlling for the preferences of Congress and the 
President).   
 25 Justice Antonin Scalia put it this way:  “Ultimately, the [J]ustices of the Court are taken 
from the society, . . . and however impartial they may try to be, they are going to bring 
with them those societ[al] attitudes.”  DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER:  THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 343 (5th ed. 2000) (alteration in original). 
 26 McGuire & Stimson, supra note 9, at 1020; see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a 
Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court supports the major policies of the dominant political pow-
er because doing otherwise risks undermining its own legitimacy if its rulings are not en-
forced). 
 27 McGuire & Stimson, supra note 9, at 1033. 
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Mishler and Sheehan, [we find] no evidence for a direct path of in-
fluence from public opinion to Court decisions.”28  Charting a more 
moderate course are those scholars who identify some “direct” but 
relatively small effect.  Stimson et al., fall into this category: 
 
Norpoth and Segal (1994) argue that the role of public opinion on 
Court decisions is wholly indirect through the election-nomination-
confirmation process.  Mishler and Sheehan (1993, 1994) claim a direct 
public opinion influence.  Our results, with similar data but quite differ-
ent model specification, leave us in the middle of this debate.  We believe 
there is a trace of influence for both processes, but our results are too 
weak to leave us confident about the matter.29 
III.  OUR STUDY 
Although the studies listed in Table 1 are thoroughly professional 
efforts, published in top disciplinary journals, features of their re-
search design raise some red flags.  Of particular concern is that they 
cannot incorporate controls at the case level because they aggregate 
by term.  To provide but one example:  we know that the Justices 
tend to reverse the decisions of the court below (usually a U.S. court 
of appeals).30  To account for this tendency, researchers modeling the 
ideological direction of the Court’s decisions (liberal or conservative) 
almost always incorporate a variable encoding the direction of the 
lower court’s decision (liberal or conservative).31  The idea is that 
even a very liberal (conservative) Supreme Court would be inclined 
to reverse a liberal (conservative) lower court decision given the ma-
jority’s general propensity to reverse. 
It is easy to add this variable if the study models decisions on a 
case-by-case basis; it is impossible to do so if the study models deci-
sions on a term-by-term basis—as the existing public opinion research 
does—without running the risk of ecological fallacy.  The same holds 
for many other covariates of Court decisions.  Although some are an-
nual (such as the ideology of the median Justice), others are not, in-
cluding the issue area and the parties.  Aggregating by term is not 
 
 28 Norpoth & Segal, supra note 15, at 711. 
 29 Stimson, MacKuen & Erikson, supra note 13, at 556. 
 30 Between the 1953 and 2008 terms, the Court ruled for the petitioner in 64% of the 6286 
orally argued cases in which the Supreme Court Database specifies the direction of the 
decision and a winning party.  THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 22. 
 31 See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3; Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects:  How the Norm of 
Federal Judicial Experience Biases the  Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 872 (2009) (“con-
trolling for the ideological direction of the lower court’s decision” in an analysis of the ef-
fects of Justices’ circuit court experience). 
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even an especially good strategy for considering the effect of the pub-
lic’s mood on the Court because it fails to exploit Stimson’s quarterly 
data. 
For these reasons, our analysis of Friedman’s thesis proceeds at 
the case level.  The dependent variable is the ideological direction of 
each decision in all orally argued cases between 1958 and 200832—
and not the percentage liberal each term.  That is, we intend to study 
the decisions in 5,675 cases, rather than a single percentage in 50 
terms. 
By “ideological direction,” we mean the direction of the decision 
(liberal or conservative), as coded by the U.S. Supreme Court Data-
base, the same source most of the other public opinion studies use.33  
The database’s classifications generally comport with conventional 
understandings.  “Liberal” decisions are those in favor of defendants 
in criminal cases; of women and minorities in civil rights cases; of in-
dividuals against the government in First Amendment, privacy, and 
due process cases; of unions over individuals and individuals over 
businesses in labor cases; and of the government over businesses in 
cases involving economic regulation.  “Conservative” decisions are the 
reverse.  Table 2 provides basic summary information about this vari-
able (and all others in our analysis). 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics (N=5675) 
Variable Description Mean  
(Std. 
Dev.) 
Dependent Variable  
Direction of Decision 
Whether the Court reached a liber-
al (=1) or conservative (=0)decision
0.501   
(0.500) 
Key Independent  
Variable    
Public Mood 
Stimson’s quarterly measure of 
public mood (the higher the score, 
the more liberal the public)
61.06234   
(4.628) 
 
 32 Quarterly public mood data begin with the fourth quarter of 1958 (covering all but two 
cases in the 1958 term) through the fourth quarter of 2008 (covering only four cases of 
the 2008 term). 
 33 THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 22. 
 34 The minimum is 51.363; the maximum is 74.18. 
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Control Variables   
Direction of the Lower 
Court Decision 
Whether the court whose decision 
the Supreme Court reviewed 
reached a liberal (=1) or conserva-
tive (=0) decision 
0.463   
(0.499) 
Ideology of the Su-
preme Court 
Martin & Quinn’s estimate of the 
ideology of the median justice (the 
higher the score, the more conserv-
ative the median) 
0.36435   
(0.495) 
U.S. Liberal Party 
Whether the United States (or an 
agency), as petitioner or respon-
dent, argued for a liberal decision 
(=1) or not (=0) 
0.065   
(0.247) 
U.S. Conservative Party 
Whether the United States (or an 
agency), as petitioner or respon-
dent, argued for a conservative de-
cision (=1) or not (=0) 
0.134   
(0.340) 
Civil Liberties 
Civil Liberties case (=1) or not 
(=0)36 
0.549   
(0.498) 
 
Economics Economics case (=1) or not (=0)37 
0.275   
(0.446) 
 
Judicial Power 
Judicial power case (=1) or not (=0) 
 
0.129   
(0.335) 
 
Federalism Federalism case (=1) or not (=0) 
0.048   
(0.214) 
 
Ideology of the       Poole’s Common Space score (the -0.21138   
 
 35 The minimum is -.85; the maximum is 1.027. 
 36 The Civil Liberties category includes Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, 
Due Process, Privacy, and Attorneys (i.e., “issueArea” = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) in the U.S. Su-
preme Court Database.  THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 22.   
 37 The Economics category includes Unions, Economic Activity, and Taxation (i.e., “issueA-
rea" = 7, 8, 12) in the U.S. Supreme Court Database.  THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, su-
pra note 22.   
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President higher the score, the more conserv-
ative the President) 
(0.519) 
Ideology of the House 
Poole’s Common Space score (the 
higher the score, the more conserv-
ative the House) 
0.05739   
(0.114) 
Ideology of the Senate 
Poole’s Common Space score (the 
higher the score, the more conserv-
ative the Senate)
0.06940   
(0.106) 
 
The independent variable of primary interest is Stimson’s quarter-
ly public mood measure.  Because lower scores are more conservative, 
we expect this variable to be positively related to the direction of the 
decision.  In other words, if Friedman is right and public opinion in-
fluences the Court, then the more liberal the public mood, the high-
er the likelihood of a liberal decision. 
Finally, we include in the model a host of variables that might also 
affect the Court’s decision (see Table 2).  Seven are case-level va-
riables:  the direction of the lower court’s decision, the side 
represented by the U.S. government (if it was a party to the suit, lib-
eral or conservative), and four issue dummies (“Federalism” is the 
omitted category in the model).  Given the Court’s tendency to re-
verse (and our coding of the relevant variables), we expect the direc-
tion of the lower court decision to be negatively related to the Court’s 
decision.  As for the U.S. government, the existing literature suggests 
that the side it represents will prevail more often than not.41  If so, 
 
 38 The minimum is -.724; the maximum is .503. 
 39 The minimum is -.226; the maximum is .194. 
 40 The minimum is -.199; the maximum is .183. 
 41 See, e.g., REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL:  THE POLITICS OF LAW 145 
(1992) (“[B]etween 1959 and 1986. . . . [t]he party that the government supported with 
an amicus brief won 71.9 percent of the time.”); JEFF YATES, POPULAR JUSTICE:  
PRESIDENTIAL PRESTIGE AND EXECUTIVE SUCCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT 96 (John Ken-
neth White ed., 2002) (noting the “overwhelmingly successful record” the solicitor gen-
eral has before the Court); see also RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS:  
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE STRUCTURING OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS LITIGATION 5 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1st ed. 2003) (“The Court . . . grants a higher 
percentage of the solicitor general’s petitions and the government is more successful on 
the merits than any other litigant.”); ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 177 (Samuel Krislov ed., 1971) (“Throughout its history the United States has 
won most of its cases in the Supreme Court.”); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the 
Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325 (1992) (“[W]e have 
several reasons to suspect that Congress and the [P]resident affect Supreme Court deci-
sion making . . . .”); Jeffrey A. Segal & Cheryl Reedy, The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimina-
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“U.S. Liberal Party” should be positively signed; “U.S. Conservative 
Party” should be negatively signed. 
This leaves the four term-level covariates, all of which attempt to 
assess the ideology of the various branches of government.  For the 
U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. Presi-
dent, we use Poole’s Common Space scores.  These reflect roll call 
votes in each House or, in the case of the President, his position on 
bills before Congress.42 
We measure the Court’s ideology using Martin and Quinn’s ideal 
point estimate of the median Justice each term.43  The Martin and 
Quinn measure is also based on votes—all those cast by the Justices in 
non-unanimous cases.  Table 2 supplies summary statistics on all four 
measures of ideology; Figure 3 depicts them over time. 
FIGURE 3. IDEOLOGY OF THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 
3a.  The Senate, House, and President 
        1960               1970               1980              1990               2000               2010 
Year 
 
tion:  The Role of the Solicitor General, 41 POL. RES. Q. 553, 555–56 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court is responsive to the executive branch of government through its support for the so-
licitor general.”).   
 42 VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2010); see also KEITH T. POOLE 
& HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS:  A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL 
VOTING 7 (1997) (analyzing the dynamics of roll call voting using a liberal/conservative 
structure). 
 43 MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.wustl.edu/ (last visited Sep. 22, 2010); see And-
rew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 152 (2002) (investigat-
ing judicial preferences and finding that ideal points of many Justices change over time). 
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3b.  The Court 
              1960            1970            1980            1990             2000           2010 
Year 
 
 
Under Poole’s and Martin and Quinn’s coding schemes, the lower 
the ideology score, the more liberal the branch.  Hence, if these va-
riables affect the Court’s decision, we expect negatively signed coeffi-
cients (i.e., the lower the score, the higher the likelihood of a liberal 
decision). 
IV.  RESULTS 
To assess the effect of the public’s mood on the ideological direction 
of the Court’s decision, we use logistic regression (with various ro-
bustness checks).44  Table 3 displays the results.  Note that we cluster 
the observations by term, which helps account for any term-to-term 
correlations in the data (and results in higher standard errors). 
 
 
 44 For example, we reestimated the model using a random effects logistic regression.  The 
results are virtually identical to those displayed in Table 3.  Most importantly, the coeffi-
cient on Public Mood (Quarterly) remains statistically significant (.023, with a standard error 
of .007). 
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TABLE 3  RESULTS OF REGRESSING THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT’S 
DECISION (1=LIBERAL; 0=CONSERVATIVE) ON THE PUBLIC MOOD AND 
OTHER COVARIATES 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Er-
ror)
Public Mood (Quarterly) 0.023 (0.008) 
Direction of the Lower Court Decision -1.041 (0.070) 
Ideology of the Supreme Court -0.547 (0.049) 
U.S. Liberal Party 0.316 (0.131) 
U.S. Conservative Party -0.757 (0.095) 
Civil Liberties -0.287 (0.134) 
Economics -0.033 (0.135) 
Judicial Power -1.015 (0.148) 
Ideology of the President 0.017 (0.056) 
Ideology of the House -0.140 (0.331) 
Ideology of the Senate 0.283 (0.412) 
Intercept -0.367 (0.459) 
Note: Robust standard errors reported, clustered by term.  Italicized variables are 
statistically significant at the =0.05 level.  Federalism is the omitted category. N=5675. 
 
Beginning with the primary variable of interest, Public Mood (Quar-
terly), we find support for Friedman’s basic claim.  The coefficient is 
statistically significant and positively signed, indicating that the more 
liberal the public mood, the higher the likelihood of a liberal deci-
sion. 
But how much higher?  Keeping in mind that the Court usually 
takes cases to reverse,45 the predicted probability of a liberal decision 
is .5946 when the Justices review a conservative lower court decision 
and the public mood is very conservative.47  If the public mood is very 
liberal, the probability jumps to .71.48  Alternatively, if the Court re-
views a liberal lower court decision when the public is very conserva-
tive, the probability that it will affirm (i.e., reach a liberal decision) is 
just .33,49 but it increases to .4650 when the public is very liberal.  Fig-
ure 3 shows the predicted probabilities in between these extremes, 
along with the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 45 See THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 22. 
 46 The 95% confidence interval is [.54, .63]. 
 47 All other variables are set at their mean or mode. 
 48 The 95% confidence interval is [.66, .75]. 
 49 The 95% confidence interval is [.30, .37]. 
 50 The 95% confidence interval is [.41, .52]. 
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FIGURE 4.  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A LIBERAL DECISION IN A CIVIL 
LIBERTIES CASE AS THE PUBLIC MOOD MOVES FROM VERY 
CONSERVATIVE TO VERY LIBERAL 
 
Note:  This figure is based on the model in Table 2.  The black lines indicate the 
predicted probabilities in civil liberties cases and the gray lines shows 95% confidence 
intervals.  To generate these quantities of interest, we used S-Post.  Civil Liberties is set at 
1.  All other variables are set at their means (Ideology of the Supreme Court, Ideology of the 
President, Ideology of the House, Ideology of the Senate) or at their mode, which is 0 (U.S. Lib-
eral Party, U.S. Conservative Party, Economics, Judicial Power). 
 Whether the difference in the predicted probabilities displayed in 
Figure 3 is large or small is a question readers must answer for them-
selves.  For what it’s worth, we think they are large—actually quite 
large—given that we control for many other variables that have an 
appreciable effect on the direction of the Court’s decisions. 
 The ideology of the Court, as represented in our model by the 
ideal point of the median Justice, provides an example.  Table 3 tells 
us that the effect is statistically significant, such that the more con-
servative the median, the less likely a liberal decision, and Figure 4 
reveals that the effect is quite dramatic.  All else being equal, the like-
lihood of the Court reversing a conservative lower court decision 
(i.e., reaching a liberal decision) when the median Justice is very lib-
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eral is a high .78.51  The likelihood plummets to .55 when the median 
is very conservative.52 
 
FIGURE 5. PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A LIBERAL DECISION IN A CIVIL 
LIBERTIES CASE AS THE MEDIAN JUSTICE MOVES FROM MOST 
CONSERVATIVE TO MOST LIBERAL 
 
Note:  This figure is based on the model in Table 2.  The black line indicates the predicted 
probabilities in civil liberties cases and the gray line shows 95% confidence intervals.  To 
generate these quantities of interest, we used S-Post.  Civil Liberties is set at 1 and the Direction of 
the Lower Court Decision is conservative.  All other variables are set at their means (Public Mood, 
Ideology of the Supreme Court, Ideology of the President, Ideology of the House, Ideology of the Senate) or at 
their mode, which is 0 (U.S. Liberal Party, U.S. Conservative Party, Economics, Judicial Power). 
 
This finding is not especially surprising.  On most realist theories 
of judging—especially judging on the Supreme Court—the Justices’ 
ideology affects their decisions.  What is surprising is that even after 
taking into account ideology, Public Mood continues to be a statistical-
ly significant and seemingly non-trivial predictor of outcomes (see 
Table 3 and Figure 4). 
 
 51 The 95% confidence interval is [0.75, 0.81]. 
 52 The 95% confidence interval is [0.53, 0.58]. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
No doubt, our results should encourage Professor Friedman and 
others who believe that “the Court and the public will come into basic 
alliance with each other.”53  At the least, our results indicate that an 
association exists between the public’s mood and the Court’s deci-
sions. 
Whether that association is something more—whether public 
opinion “influences” the Court, as the subtitle of Professor Fried-
man’s book asserts—we cannot say.  This is so for two reasons.  First, 
despite our efforts to control for the more obvious determinants of 
the Court’s decisions, our statistical model undoubtedly misses some 
important variables.  One indication of under-specification comes 
from our own model.  When we reestimated it, retaining the main ef-
fects of Public Mood (Quarterly) and the issue area dummies but inte-
racting Mood with the issues, we found that public opinion was not a 
good predictor of the outcome in Judicial Power cases.  Because liti-
gation in this area tends to fly under the public’s radar screen, the 
(non-)result implies the need to control for the importance of each 
case.54  Future research could take this step by deploying any number 
of measures of salience, including the Epstein-Segal “New York Times” 
approach,55 the number of participating amici,56 or even future cita-
tions to the opinion.57 
A second reason we are unwilling to make the leap from associa-
tion to causality is we have neither posited nor tested a mechanism 
 
 53 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 15. 
 54 But see Giles, Blackstone & Vining supra note 8, at 15 (finding that “the effects of public 
opinion on liberalism appear to be consistently less in salient cases” because “case sa-
lience may actually intensify the operation of [the Justices’ own ideological] prefe-
rences”). 
 55 Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 (2000) 
(measuring issue salience by whether the New York Times carried a front page story about 
the case). 
 56 FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE 
SUPREME COURT:  THE COLLEGIAL GAME 46 (2000) (measuring political salience by “de-
termin[ing] whether a case had more amici filings than the average case heard during a 
term”). 
 57 See, e.g., James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law:  Measuring the Legal Importance 
of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 326 (2007) (“It . . . seems rea-
sonable to determine how relevant a particular opinion is by considering how it is em-
bedded in the broader network of opinions compromising the law.”); Lee Epstein, Wil-
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent:  A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis 14 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 510, 2d series, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542834 (“We 
proxy importance by the number of Supreme Court and court of appeals citations to the 
opinion.”). 
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for the effect of public opinion on the Court.  Certainly, Professor 
Friedman and others could be right:  the public has a direct influ-
ence on the Court because the Justices are concerned about their le-
gitimacy in the short and long-terms.  But it is equally plausible, as 
Flemming and Wood explain, that the Justices are simply “social be-
ings confronted with the plethora of stimuli emanating from Ameri-
can culture, media and politics.”58  In other words, the same things 
that influence public opinion may influence the Justices, who are, af-
ter all, members of the public too. 
Until we can behaviorally distinguish and assess these and other 
mechanisms, statistical confirmation of Professor Friedman’s causal 
story must wait yet another day.  What we can say, and what our re-
sults suggest, is that his account is not as implausible as some of the 
political science literature suggests. 
 
 58 Flemming & Wood, supra note 10, at 471. 
